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ABSTRACT This paper reports the results of methodological studies carried out in conjunction with the US National
Comorbidity Survey (NCS) to evaluate Version 1.0 of the World Health Organization (WHO) Composite International
Diagnostic Interview (CIDI). These studies relied on recent survey data collection methodology literature to investigate
problems regarding question comprehension, instruction comprehension, respondent motivation to report accurately, and
regarding the limits of respondent ability to report accurately. Insights and strategies developed by survey methodologists
were used to modify the CIDI in an effort to address these problems. The paper describes these strategies and methodolog-
ical studies that evaluated their effects, including a clinical reappraisal study and a field experiment that evaluated the impact
of question modifications on prevalence estimates. The paper closes with a discussion of remaining methodological problems
with the CIDI and potentially useful future studies that might be able to develop solutions to these problems.
tured instrument like the CIDI in the NCS because of
the large sample size, the enormous geographic disper-
sion of the sample, and the prohibitive costs and logis-
tic complications of the study. The NCS was the first
large-scale general population survey to administer the
CIDI in the United States. Although WHO CIDI Field
Trials carried out prior to the NCS documented good
performance of the instrument (Wittchen 1994), the
field trials were conducted largely in clinical samples
and administered in clinical settings. As a result, we
considered it very important to carry out pretests before
using the instrument in a community sample. 
As described more fully below, the NCS pretests
were guided by the literature on survey data collection
methodology (e.g. Bradburn et al. 1979; Moss and
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Introduction
This paper presents results of methodological studies
carried out in conjunction with the US National
Comorbidity Survey (NCS) (Kessler et al. 1994). These
studies focused on the World Health Organization
(WHO) Composite International Diagnostic Interview
(CIDI) (WHO 1990), the diagnostic interview used in
the NCS. Results are presented both of NCS pretests
that led to CID modifications and of subsequent
methodological studies aimed at evaluating the effects of
these modifications.
The NCS was a large nationally representative sur-
vey of the US household population designed to esti-
mate the prevalence and correlates of DSM-III-R psy-
chiatric disorders. It was necessary to use a fully struc-
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Goldstein 1979; Biderman 1980; Cannell et al. 1981;
Jabine et al. 1984; Tanur 1992; Schwarz and Sudman
1992; 1994; 1996). Sudman, Bradburn and Schwarz
(1996) provide a comprehensive review of these devel-
opments. This literature provided a number of impor-
tant insights and strategies that were used to make
modifications to the CIDI in sections of the instru-
ment where the pretests documented comprehension
problems. The paper closes with a discussion of
remaining methodological problems with the CIDI
and potentially useful future studies that might be able
to develop solutions to these problems. 
Methods and procedures
Six separate methodological studies of the CIDI were
carried out in conjunction with the NCS. The meth-
ods and procedures used in each of these studies are
described in this section of the paper. We then turn to
a presentation of study-specific results. The first three
of these six studies were non-experimental pretests
based on convenience samples that were administered
by experienced survey interviewers trained in the
CIDI. Modifications to the CIDI were made in the
NCS based on the results of these pretests. The other
three were carried out subsequent to the NCS in an
effort to evaluate the effects of the CIDI modifications.
The first was a field experiment that evaluated the
impact of the CIDI modifications on prevalence esti-
mates. The second was a post hoc comparison of symp-
tom and diagnostic prevalence estimates in the NCS
versus the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study
(Robins and Regier 1991). The third was a clinical
reappraisal study of the CIDI diagnostic classifications
in the NCS based on blind reinterviews carried out by
clinicians using the Structured Clinical Interview for
DSM-III-R (SCID; Spitzer et al. 1992). 
The NCS pretests
The first pretest was carried out in a quota sample of 30
volunteers in the age range 15–54, recruited by house-
hold screening, in the Detroit Metropolitan Area.
Roughly equal numbers of men (n = 13) and women (n
= 17) were interviewed, half of them selected from a
working-class neighbourhood and the other half from a
middle-class neighbourhood. Interviews were carried
out face to face in the homes of respondents and were
followed by a telephone-debriefing interview. A $25
financial incentive was offered for participation. As
described below, the main focus of this first pretest was
on discovering comprehension problems in the CIDI.
The second pretest was carried out in a quota sample
of 50 volunteers (25 men and 25 women) in the age
range 18–54 residing in Ann Arbor, Michigan, who were
recruited from advertisements. Half of these respondents
had no college education and the other half were college
graduates. Interviews were carried out in the homes of
respondents. A $25 financial incentive was offered for
participation. This second pretest had two purposes. The
first was to evaluate the effects of question wording
changes made to correct the comprehension problems
discovered in the first pretest. The second purpose was to
evaluate a series of strategies aimed at motivating serious
and accurate memory search and reporting. 
The third pretest was carried out in a quota sample
of 50 volunteers (22 men and 28 women) in the age
range 15–54, sampled and interviewed in their homes
using the same sampling frame and recruitment proce-
dures as in the first pretest as well as in a small conve-
nience sample of patients interviewed at a local com-
munity mental health centre. A $25 financial incen-
tive was offered for participation. The purpose of this
pretest was to obtain timing estimates and to make
small revisions to the near-final version of the full sur-
vey instrument to be used in the NCS. The instrument
tested included both the modified CIDI and detailed
batteries of questions on risk factors and social conse-
quences of psychiatric disorders developed for the sur-
vey. Unlike the earlier pretests, no debriefing or special
methodological probing was used in this third pretest
as the main purpose was to simulate production inter-
viewing as closely as possible. No results from this
pretest are therefore presented in this paper. 
The experimental comparison of the original and modified
versions of the CIDI
The remaining three methodological studies consisted
of evaluations of the final instrument used in the NCS.
The first of these three studies was an experimental
evaluation in which a nationally representative quota
sample of respondents in the age range 18–54 residing
in households with telephones was given the introduc-
tion and the anxiety and mood disorders sections from
either the original WHO CIDI Version 1.0 (n = 105)
or the modified version of the CIDI included in the
NCS (n = 106). These interviews were carried out by
experienced telephone interviewers who were trained
in either the original CIDI or the modified CIDI. The
purpose was to make a global evaluation of the impact
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of our modifications on lifetime prevalence estimates
of DSM-III-R disorders.
Sampling for this pretest began with a geographical-
ly stratified and nationally representative sample of
listed telephone numbers. The ‘most recent birthday
method’ was used to select a random respondent of a
prespecified sex from those at home at the time of con-
tact. Contact attempts were made in the evenings and
on weekends to guarantee that employed people had
an adequate chance of being selected. The proportion
of males and females was varied over the course of the
study in order to guarantee a distribution of men and
women that was as equal as possible. The target sample
size was 100 interviews in each condition and the study
was terminated at the end of the week in which this
quota was achieved. No financial incentive was offered
for participation. A 62% cooperation rate was
obtained, including 51 men and 54 women randomly
assigned to the WHO-CIDI condition and 52 men and
54 women assigned to the modified CIDI condition. 
The post hoc comparison of the NCS with the ECA
The second methodological study after the pretests was
a study of similarities and differences in patterns of
symptom reporting and estimated diagnostic preva-
lences for disorders that were assessed in a comparable
way in the NCS and the Epidemiologic Catchment
Area (ECA) study (Robins and Regier 1991). As the
ECA was based on DSM-III criteria and the NCS on
DSM-III-R criteria, comparisons were made by recod-
ing the NCS data to DSM-III criteria. As most of the
results of the comparative NCS-ECA study have been
reported previously (Regier et al. 1997), only high-
lights of this investigation relevant to other aspects of
NCS methodological studies are presented here. 
The clinical reappraisal study
The final methodological study was a clinical reap-
praisal study in which small diagnosis-specific random
subsamples of NCS respondents who endorsed stem
questions for particular diagnoses were recontacted by
clinical interviewers who administered an expanded
version of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-
III-R (SCID) (Spitzer et al. 1992). Stem questions are
the first questions in each diagnostic section, which
ask the subject whether he or she ever experienced
core symptoms of the syndrome under investigation.
For example, the first question in the panic section of
the CIDI asks the respondents if they ever had sudden
spells or attacks of feeling very frightened or anxious.
Only the subsample of respondents that endorses such
stem questions is administered the remaining questions
in a diagnostic section. 
Aspects of the clinical reappraisal study have been
reported previously (Blazer et al. 1994; Kessler et al.
1995; Warner et al. 1995; Wittchen et al. 1995, 1996;
Kendler et al. 1997; Kessler, Crum et al. 1997).
However, this is the first time the full set of diagnosis-
level results has been presented. The clinical reap-
praisal study was carried out in 10 separate disorder-
specific subsamples of NCS respondents rather than in
one large subsample in order to minimize the burden of
the reinterview on individual respondents. Clinical
interviewers were blind to the original CIDI diagnoses
in the NCS. Reinterviews took place between 13 and
33 months after the initial NCS interview.
Participants included subsamples of at least 30 respon-
dents (at least 20 of whom fulfilled CIDI/DSM-III-R cri-
teria and at least 10 non-cases) for each diagnosis includ-
ed in the NCS. This sample size decision was based on
the fact that it yields a standard error between 0.10 and
0.15 for κ in the range 0.60–0.80. The decision to select
controls who endorsed the stem questions was based on
the desire to provide a more sensitive evaluation of the
extent to which the modified CIDI can correctly dis-
criminate true cases from non-cases who are near the
diagnostic threshold than if the controls had included
respondents who failed to endorse the stem questions.
The interviewers in the clinical reappraisal study
included a physician, clinical psychologists, psychiatric
social workers, and psychiatric nurses. The interview-
ers had between two and 19 years of clinical experi-
ence. Each interviewer was trained on a single diag-
nostic section of the CIDI and SCID at a time and
worked on that section until all interviews were com-
pleted. Interviewers were recruited and assigned to
work on particular sections based on their expertise.
For example, interviewers who worked on the sub-
stance disorders sections were recruited from the clini-
cal staff of the alcohol and drug abuse service at the
University of Michigan Medical Center. Clinical diag-
noses were based on consensus ratings between the
interviewer and the supervisor (JMA). Discrepancies
were resolved in consensus conferences with senior
clinical consultants. The clinical reappraisal inter-
views were carried out by readministering the relevant
modified CIDI section followed by a modified version
of the SCID for that same diagnosis. The reinterview
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began by introducing the task in the following way:
I am going to be briefly asking you some of the same
questions you were asked on [date of initial interview].
This is a test of the interview and not a test of your
memory, so answer the questions as completely as you
can without trying to remember what you said to the
other interviewer. During the first interview, you
reported that [diagnostic stem question]. I will be ask-
ing you some questions about this. 
At the end of the introduction, the clinical interview-
er administered the modified CIDI section, excluding
the stem question, followed by a modified version of
the SCID for the same diagnosis. The first SCID mod-
ification was that we omitted the introductory
overview section conventionally used, in which the
interviewer asks about the patient’s demographic char-
acteristics, past and current psychopathology, role
functioning, and life stressors. Second, the SCID ‘skip
rules’ to omit further questions after failing a required
criterion were not used. This modification was intro-
duced in order to guarantee that the clinical supervisor
and clinical consultants could evaluate each criterion,
even if they disagreed with the interviewer about early
criteria, as well as to allow an assessment of agreement
and disagreement between the modified CIDI and the
SCID for each criterion. Third, the interviewer was
required to ask the mandatory SCID criterion ques-
tions without assuming an answer even if the criterion
information was already obtained from a similar CIDI
retest question. Fourth, the required SCID symptom
and probe questions were supplemented with addition-
al probes in an attempt to guarantee that the clinical
interviewer evaluated each criterion fully and consis-
tently. It is important to note that the inclusion of
these additional probes is consistent with the SCID
administration guidelines, which allows the interview-
er to use additional probes whenever the answers to
the initial standard SCID questions do not allow a
symptom to be rated with certainty.
The introduction was designed to minimise the pos-
sibility of the respondent consciously attempting to
remember his or her earlier answers, something that
could lead to an artificially high estimate of test–retest
reliability, while simultaneously forcing consistency in
the report of the lifetime stem question. The decision
to force consistency in the stem question was based on
past experience that reinterview respondents often
deny stem questions that they endorsed in the baseline
interview, leading clinical reinterviewers to declare
that the diagnoses based on the initial structured inter-
views were invalid without clinically reappraising the
symptoms reported in the structured interview (Robins
1985; Bromet et al. 1986). We know, however, that the
vast majority of respondents who are presented with
the fact that they previously endorsed the stem ques-
tion will confirm this report on reinterview (McLeod
et al. 1990), leading to the strong suspicion that failure
to obtain high consistency in conventional test–retest
reliability studies is due to respondents reluctance to
rehash previously reported material more than to
memory failure. Some previous reliability and validity
studies have addressed this problem by carrying out a
third interview that reviews discrepancies in reports in
the first two interviews with the respondent in an
effort to resolve reporting inconsistencies (Manuzza et
al. 1989; Williams et al. 1992). We rejected this option
because of concerns about the difficulty of presenting
inconsistencies to respondents in a way that did not
make them defensive. We decided that a better strate-
gy was to force consistency in the stem questions by
means of the above introduction. Although, in theory,
reappraisal interview respondents could have denied
endorsing the stem questions in the earlier interview,
this occurred in only a few cases in the NCS clinical
reappraisal sample. 
Owing to financial constraints we did not include
respondents who denied the diagnostic stem questions
in the reappraisal study. As a result of this design fea-
ture we have no way of estimating the proportion of
NCS non-cases who denied the stem questions initial-
ly but would have endorsed them and gone on to meet
diagnostic criteria on reinterview. It is noteworthy,
though, that the test–retest reliability studies in the
WHO CIDI Field Trials, reviewed by Wittchen
(1994), found that it was rare for respondents who
failed to endorse a stem question in an initial CIDI
interview to go on to meet full diagnostic criteria for
that disorder in a second CIDI interview. Based on this
result, the test–retest reliabilities reported below are
based on the upper bound assumption that none of the
NCS respondents who denied the CIDI stem question
in their original interview would have been classified
as a SCID case if they had been reinterviewed. This
means that the estimated value of the correspondence
between the CIDI and the SCID, based on the κ sta-
tistic (Cohen 1960; Fleiss 1981), is an upper bound
estimate.
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Results 
Improving question comprehension in the first and second
NCS pretests
Most methodological studies of survey instruments
start with the problem of question comprehension.
Ambiguous questions are obviously more likely to be
misconstrued than unambiguous questions. It is less
obvious, though, just how large a proportion of ques-
tions in most surveys are ambiguous. Belson (1981) was
the first survey methodologist to document that many
survey questions are misunderstood. Belson carried out
a debriefing study of a sample of general population
survey respondents in the UK who were given a set of
standard survey questions and found that more than
70% of respondents interpreted at least some questions
differently from the researcher. Oksenberg, Cannell,
and Kalton (1991) came to a similar conclusion in
their subsequent debriefing of a nationally representa-
tive sample of respondents in the US who were admin-
istered standard health interview survey questions. At
least one key phrase in two-thirds of the questions in
their study was misinterpreted by respondents. 
One of the most striking aspects of these studies is
that both Belson and Oksenberg et al. found that
respondents generally believed that they understood
what the investigator meant even when their interpre-
tations of the questions were actually quite idiosyn-
cratic. Oksenberg and her colleagues suggested that
this occurs because the survey interview situation is a
special kind of interaction in which the standard rules
of conversation – rules that help fill in the gaps in
meaning that exist in most speech – do not apply.
Unlike the situation in normal conversational prac-
tice, the respondent in the survey interview often has
only a vague notion of the identity of the person to
whom he is talking or the purpose of the conversation
(Cannell et al. 1968). The person who asks the ques-
tions (the interviewer) is not the person who formu-
lated the questions (the researcher), and the question-
er is often unable to clarify the respondent’s uncertain-
ties about the intent of the questions. Furthermore, the
flow of questions in the interview is established prior to
the beginning of the conversation, leading to more
misreading than in normal conversations, even when
questions are seemingly straightforward.
Based on the results of these studies, survey method-
ologists in recent years have encouraged researchers to
carry out cognitive pretest interviews in an effort to
learn more about question comprehension. Systematic
methods for carrying out these interviews have been
developed for this purpose that feature the use of struc-
tured debriefing (Ericson and Simon 1993; DeMaio
and Rothgeb 1996; Fowler and Cannell 1996). See
Sudman et al. (1996), Chapter 2, for a review of these
methods. These methods were used in the first two
pretests carried out in preparation for the NCS 
The entire CIDI was administered in the first of
these pretests by experienced interviewers who were
trained in the use of the CIDI by the WHO coordina-
tor for CIDI 1.0 (HUW) and a certified CIDI trainer
(JMA). Each interviewer completed two practice
interviews before beginning the pretest. A random
subsample of 20 questions was probed for understand-
ing. As described below, a much smaller proportion of
interviewer-rated misinterpretations was found in this
pretest than in the Belson and Oksenberg et al. studies.
We believe that this favourable result can be attributed
to the fact that special care was taken to write CIDI
questions in as explicit a fashion as possible. However,
as described below, a number of the remaining misin-
terpretations are systematic and quite serious. 
The 30 interviews in the first pretest were tape
recorded and the audiotapes coded by a special team of
‘behaviour coders’ using codes developed by Cannell
and his colleagues (Fowler and Cannell 1996) to
record three types of behaviour indicative of potential
question problems: 
• the interviewer misread the question; 
• there was a long pause after the question before the
respondent answered; and 
• the respondent asked for some clarification of the ques-
tion. Approximately three dozen CIDI questions were
pinpointed by this procedure as ones that might be sys-
tematically problematic (defined as having at least one
problem indicator for at least five respondents).
After the behaviour coding was completed and the
results tabulated we debriefed interviewers with a spe-
cial focus on the potentially problematic questions
arising in the debriefing and behaviour coding. The
debriefing was carried out using a focus group format in
which we went through the entire instrument asking
the interviewers to point out questions and procedures
that they considered problematic. In addition to elicit-
ing information about the interviewer perceptions of
problems, we discussed interviewer impressions about
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the reasons for these problems and possible ways they
might be resolved.
Respondents were then debriefed in telephone
interviews. The focus was on questions considered
potentially problematic. Two debriefing methods were
used here. The first was the ‘think aloud’ strategy
developed by Ericson and Simon (1993) in which
respondents were asked to discuss aloud their thoughts
concerning the meaning of questions and how they
formulated answers. Respondents were instructed to
start ‘thinking aloud’ as soon as the questions were read
to them. The second debriefing method was the ‘repeat
the question’ strategy used by many cognitive psychol-
ogists to find out which aspects of questions are most
salient to respondents (DeMaio and Rothgeb 1996).
This method involves asking respondents to repeat the
question they just answered and recording the aspects
of the questions that could be recalled and those that
could not. This method was used for only 10 questions
per respondent based on the finding in previous
debriefing studies that respondents become unrealisti-
cally attentive to precise wording when they are asked
to repeat a larger number of questions.
These debriefing interviews showed that there was
considerable confusion about approximately two dozen
CIDI questions in addition to those in the schizophre-
nia section. Three sources of this confusion were
inferred. First, a number of the CIDI questions were
ambiguously worded. For example, the question about
persistence of unrealistic fears of phobic stimuli, which
asked respondents whether their fears ‘ever lasted
months or even years’, was commonly misinterpreted
as asking about the duration of the autonomic arousal
associated with exposure rather than, as was intended,
about whether or not autonomic arousal occurred
every time the respondent was exposed to the feared
object or situation. Changes in question wording were
introduced into the revised instrument used in the sec-
ond pretest to clarify these types of ambiguity. The
same two debriefing methods were used in the second
pretest as in the first. Much less evidence of miscom-
prehension was found than in the first pretest. It is
noteworthy, however, that the sampling frame was dif-
ferent in the second pretest, which could have
accounted for at least some of this difference. 
Second, a number of the questions were very com-
plex. For example, the major depression stem question
asked about periods of two weeks when ‘most of the
day most every day’ the respondent felt sad or blue or
lost interest. It was common to find that respondents
who were asked to repeat this question were unable to
repeat all important aspects of it (that it had to last a
minimum of two weeks, that the depressed mood had
to occur nearly every day and that the depressed mood
was pervasive on the days it occurred). Some questions
were found to create more serious difficulties of this sort
than others. For example, none of the respondents who
were asked to repeat the following question about ago-
raphobia was able to recall all important aspects of it:
When you had this unreasonably strong fear, were you
afraid of collapsing, or of the occurrence of other inca-
pacitating or embarrassing symptoms when no help
was available or escape possible?
Especially complex questions such as this were broken
up into a series of less complex component questions to
deal with this problem. In cases where it was important
not to break the questions up in this way, we dealt with
the complexity problem by instructing interviewers to
read the questions slowly. ‘Repeat the question’ probes
in the second pretest revealed that these changes led to
a substantial increase in the ability to reproduce all
important aspects of questions that were found to be
problematic in this respect in the first pretest. It should
be noted, though, that confusions still remained in
some questions due to complex words and concepts. A
decision was made not to modify the questions to
address these remaining confusions because this would
require us to make more substantial changes to the
wording of CIDI questions than we were prepared to
make at that time. 
Our greatest concern about remaining areas of con-
fusion was with the schizophrenia section. Positive
responses to a question about ‘hearing things other
people couldn’t hear’, for example, might reflect sys-
tematic misunderstanding aimed at normalizing what
respondents could perceive as a strange question with
a response such as ‘yes, I have very good hearing’. The
developers of the CIDI were aware of this problem and
gave instructions to interviewers to clarify the meaning
of the question if the respondent appeared to misun-
derstand. However, this instruction put a heavy burden
on the interviewer to somehow intuit when misunder-
standing was occurring. It also created a situation in
which active respondents who verbalised their confu-
sion about the meanings of confusing questions
obtained more clarification than less active respon-
dents. 
We attempted to resolve some of these problems by
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developing explicit clarifications that would be provid-
ed to all respondents for questions that we judged to be
especially confusing, including those in the schizo-
phrenia section. However, concerns were raised by our
WHO advisor that these clarifications might alter the
meanings of the questions so much that the instrument
would no longer be equivalent to the WHO version of
the CIDI. These concerns prompted us to remove
these clarifications from the version of the instrument
used in the NCS. As it happened, our concerns were
confirmed in the production interviewing, where we
found implausibly high rates of endorsement of ques-
tions about hallucinations. Based on this result, we
decided to abandon the CIDI as the basis for assessing
schizophrenia in favour of a separate clinical reap-
praisal interview that used the CIDI schizophrenia
questions as a first-stage screen (Kendler et al. 1996). 
Third, the debriefing also revealed that substantial
confusion arose from respondents’ failure to under-
stand the purpose of the questions. For example, many
pretest respondents misinterpreted the intent of such
recall questions as ‘In your lifetime, have you ever had
two weeks or more when nearly every day you felt sad,
blue, depressed?’ The misinterpretation concerned the
task itself rather than the meanings of words or phras-
es. About half the respondents in the first pretest inter-
preted this question as it was intended by the authors
of the CIDI, namely, as a request to engage in active
memory search and report episodes of the sort in the
question. The other half, however, interpreted the
question as a request to report whether a memory of
such an episode was readily accessible. These latter
respondents did not believe that they were being asked
to engage in active memory search and did not do so.
Not surprisingly, these respondents were much less
likely to remember lifetime episodes than those who
understood the intent of the question.
The survey methodology literature provides insights
into this problem. As noted by Clark and Schrober
(1992) in their analysis of discourse rules in survey
interviews, the interaction flow in most surveys rein-
forces the perception that careful response is unimpor-
tant. Specifically, normal rules of conversation require
a person who is asked a question to signify recognition
of turn-taking either by answering the question or by
making some other relevant comment (such as, ‘um,
let me see now . . .’) within about one second after the
question is issued (Jefferson 1989) unless there is an
explicit instruction on the part of the questioner to 
the contrary. Based on this implicit rule, when an
interviewer asks a question that requires considerable
thought, the respondent is likely to assume in the
absence of instructions to the contrary that the inter-
viewer is operating under normal conversational rules
and, as such, is really asking for an immediate and
superficial answer.
Cannell et al. (1981) found that this conversation-
al artefact could be minimized by explicitly instructing
respondents to answer completely and accurately.
Based on this result, we added clarifying statements
throughout the modified CIDI developed for the sec-
ond pretest. The aim here was to inform respondents
that accuracy was important. For example, we intro-
duced the CIDI stem questions with the following
statement in the second pretest: ‘The next question
might be difficult to answer because you will need to
think back over your entire life. But it is important for
our research that you give accurate answers. So please
take your time and think carefully before answering.’
We found that the use of this introduction resulted in
respondents taking a longer time to answer the ques-
tions and in a higher proportion of respondents pro-
viding positive answers to recall questions. Debriefing
showed that this was because respondents were more
likely to engage in active memory search rather than
estimate in the second pretest than the first.
Motivating accurate reporting in the second NCS pretest
As noted above, the first pretest was concerned largely
with question comprehension, whereas the second
pretest evaluated a revised version of the CIDI that
attempted to correct the comprehension problems dis-
covered in the first pretest. The second pretest also had
a second important purpose. This second purpose was
to evaluate a series of strategies aimed at addressing
another anticipated problem that arose when respon-
dents were clearly told that we needed them to labour
at a series of demanding and potentially embarrassing
recall tasks: that some respondents would refuse this
task either explicitly or implicitly.
Recognition of this potential problem has led survey
methodologists to develop motivational techniques to
increase the chances that respondents will accept the
job of answering completely and accurately. Three
techniques that have proven to be particularly useful
in this regard in previous methodological studies were
used in the second pretest: the use of motivational
components in instructions, the use of commitment
probes, and the use of contingent reinforcement strate-
gies embedded in interviewer feedback probes. 
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Motivational instructions
There is evidence that respondents are more willing to
undertake laborious and possible painful memory
searches if they recognize some altruistic benefit of
doing so (Cannell et al. 1981). Even such an uncom-
pelling rationale as ‘it is important for our research that
you take your time and think carefully before answer-
ing’ appears to have motivational force. This is even
more so when instructions include statements that
have universalistic appeal, such as ‘accuracy is impor-
tant because social policy makers will be using these
results to make decisions that affect the lives of all of
us’. These principles were used in the revisions of the
CIDI for the second NCS pretest. We developed an
introduction that described the survey as one that
would yield important results for health policy makers.
We made it clear in question introductions throughout
the instrument that we expected thoughtful responses.
And we included motivational probes throughout the
instrument to let respondents know that ‘it is impor-
tant for our research’ that answers be as thoughtful and
as accurate as possible. Consistent with our prediction
that these changes would improve motivation, we
found that the prevalences of reporting lifetime diag-
nostic stem questions increased in the second pretest
compared to the first. 
Commitment questions
Previous methodological research has shown that
instructions that define the nature of interviewer
expectations for respondent behaviour help establish a
perspective on the interview that can have motiva-
tional force. One way this can be done is by asking an
explicit commitment question. Experimental studies
carried out by Cannell and his associates (Cannell et
al. 1981; Oksenberg et al. 1979a, 1979b) have shown
that commitment questions improve accuracy of recall.
Furthermore, the work of Cannell and associates
(Oksenberg et al. 1979a, 1979b; Cannell et al. 1981)
indicates that the joint use of motivating instructions,
contingent feedback (described below), and a commit-
ment question has an interactive effect that increases
the intensity of memory search and accuracy beyond
the effects of any one component separately. This
extends not only to the proportion of respondents in
different experimental conditions who recall and
report past experiences but also to other indicators of
commitment such as amount of detail reported and use
of personal records and other outside information
sources as memory aids during the course of the inter-
view. Based on these results, we used a commitment
probe in the second NCS pretest. This was done by
prefacing the section of the interview that asked life-
time diagnostic stem questions with the following
commitment question:
This interview asks about your physical and emotional
well-being and about areas of your life that could affect
your physical and emotional well-being. It is important
for us to get accurate information. In order to do this,
you will need to think carefully before answering the
following questions. Are you willing to do this?
As noted above, we found that the prevalence of diag-
nostic stem questions increased substantially in the
second pretest compared to the first. In addition, con-
sistent with the results of previous studies using similar
questions (Cannell et al. 1981), we found that none of
the pretest respondents answered the commitment
question negatively. Furthermore, when a slightly
revised version of this same question was used in the
NCS we found that only 35 of the 8133 respondents
responded negatively to the commitment question. 
Contingent feedback
Several survey researchers have demonstrated that ver-
bal reinforcers such as ‘thanks’ and ‘that’s useful’ can
significantly affect the behaviour of survey respon-
dents. Marquis and Cannell (1969), for example,
showed experimentally that the use of such reinforcers
resulted in a significant increase in the number of
chronic conditions reported in response to an open-
ended question about illnesses. These feedback
remarks are often used in an unsystematic way, howev-
er, as part of general procedures to build and maintain
rapport rather than in a systematic way to reinforce
good respondent performance. 
Based on these observations, Cannell and his asso-
ciates developed a method for training interviewers to
use systematic feedback – both positive and negative –
to reinforce respondent effort in reporting (Oksenberg
et al. 1979a). The central feature of this method is the
use of structured feedback statements coordinated with
the content and timing of instructions aimed at rein-
forcing respondent performance. It is important to
recognize that it is performance that is being reinforced
rather than the content of particular answers. For
example, as noted above, a difficult recall question may
be prefaced with the instruction ‘This next question
may be difficult, so please take your time before
answering.’ 
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In contingent feedback, interviewers issue some
expression of gratitude whenever the respondent seems
to consider his or her answer carefully, whether they
remembered anything or not. This structured feedback
is programmed periodically throughout the interview
in order to maintain the focus on performance stan-
dards and to reinforce motivation. 
Experiments carried out by Cannell and his associ-
ates (Miller and Cannell 1977; Vinokur et al. 1979)
have documented that the combined use of these
contingent reinforcement probes with instructions
explaining the importance of careful and accurate
reporting leads to substantial improvement in recall
of health-related events in general population sur-
veys, including validated dates of medical events.
Importantly, their results also show that self-enhanc-
ing response biases are reduced when these strategies
are used, as indicated by both a decreased tendency
to under-report potentially embarrassing conditions
and behaviours (such as gynecological problems, see-
ing an X-rated movie) and a decreased tendency to
over-report self-enhancing behaviours (such as the
number of books read in the last three months or
reading the editorial page of the newspaper the pre-
vious day). Based on these results, interviewers in the
second NCS pretest were trained and instructed to
use contingent feedback to reinforce thoughtful
reporting.
Facilitating accurate reporting 
In addition to considering strategies that improve
question comprehension and motivation to report
accurately, the literature on survey methodology has
explored the use of methods to improve accuracy once
respondents commit to active memory search. The
latter techniques provide recall aids that increase the
efficiency of memory work. Our main focus was on
improving accuracy of recall in answering lifetime
diagnostic stem questions. A good deal of evidence
suggests that people who answer negatively to ‘Have
you ever . . .?’ questions (Shannon 1979; Glucksberg
and McCloskey 1981) usually do so based on a lack-
of-knowledge inference (Genter and Collins 1981);
that is, they answer negatively based on a conclusion
drawn from lack of immediate recollection of an 
experience. 
There are a number of processes that can bring
about this inference when it is not true. One of these
considered in the NCS involved the pace of the inter-
view. A number of survey methodologists have noted
that unless interviewers are carefully trained to the
contrary, they will ask questions too quickly, which will
reduce the accuracy of respondent reports (Neter and
Waksberg 1964; Cannell et al. 1977; Sudman and
Bradburn 1982). This is especially true for lifetime
recall questions. At least two fairly obvious processes
are involved here. Haste on the part of the interview-
er conveys the message that a quick response is more
important than an accurate response (Clark and
Schober 1992). Memories are also more likely to be
recovered when respondents are allowed to think at
their own pace rather than being rushed (Bradburn et
al. 1987). 
These observations and the analysis of interaction
sequences in interviews have led Cannell and his asso-
ciates to recommend that the reading pace of the inter-
viewer should be no more than an average of two
words per second (Cannell et al. 1981), that respon-
dents should be explicitly asked to think at their own
pace (Cannell and Kahn 1968) and that critical ques-
tions should be designed to encourage periods of
silence that are explicitly defined as thinking time
(Cannell 1985a). Several experiments have docu-
mented that these procedures lead to more accurate
recall of health-related events (Lessler et al. 1989;
Burton and Blair 1991; Means et al. 1993). 
The second NCS pretest used the results of these
previous methodological studies to have interviewers
read all diagnostic stem questions slowly and deliber-
ately and to follow these questions with the request
‘Please take your time and think carefully before
answering.’ The proportion of respondents who
endorsed diagnostic stem questions increased dramati-
cally compared to the first pretest. Based on this
encouraging result, the third pretest expanded the
strategy by developing a ‘lifetime review section’ short-
ly after the beginning of the interview. This section
began with the commitment probe described earlier in
this paper followed by a general injunction for respon-
dents to take their time and think carefully. This was
then followed by the slow and deliberate reading of the
diagnostic stem questions for all the sections of the
CIDI. 
Our reasoning in developing the lifetime review
section was that this special section, administered
close to the beginning of the interview, would catch
respondents when they were mentally fresh and moti-
vated to carry out an active memory search for lifetime
episodes of the disorders. In addition, by asking all the
diagnostic stem questions before respondents became
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aware that each affirmative response would result in
them being asked a great many additional questions,
we hoped to avoid the negative response set that has
been shown to occur when respondents who want to
reduce interview length become aware of stem-branch
sequences (Bradburn et al. 1979). As described below,
a subsequent experiment verified that this approach
leads to a dramatic increase in the proportion of
respondents endorsing diagnostic stem questions. 
Acknowledging the limits of reporting ability 
Research on basic cognitive processes has shown that
memories are organized and stored in structured sets of
information packages commonly called schemas
(Markus and Zajonc 1985). When the respondent has
a history of many instances of the same experience that
cannot be discriminated, the separate instances tend to
blend together in memory to form a special kind of
memory schema called a semantic memory, a general
memory for a prototypical experience (Jobe et al. 1990;
Schwarz 1990; Means and Loftus 1991). For example,
a person may have a semantic memory of what panic
attacks are like but, due to the fact that he has had
many such attacks in his or her lifetime, may not be
able to specify details of any particular panic attack. In
comparison, when the respondent has had only a small
number of lifetime experiences of a certain sort or
when one instance stands out in memory as much dif-
ferent from the others, a memory can probably be
recovered for that particular episode. This is called an
‘episodic memory’. 
The effects of memory schemas and the difference
between semantic and episodic memories are central
themes in research on autobiographical memory.
Indeed, we must determine whether episodic memories
can be recovered and whether the respondent is
answering the questions by referring to episodic mem-
ories or by drawing inferences of what the past must
have been like on the basis of more general semantic
memories. Research shows that people are more likely
to recover episodic memories for experiences that are
recent, distinctive, and unique, while for experiences
that are frequent, typical, and regular, people will rely
more on semantic memories (Brewer 1986; Belli 1988;
Menon 1994). 
When a survey question is designed to ask about a
particular instance of an experience, it helps accuracy
of data collection if the question is posed in such a way
that the respondent knows he or she is being asked to
recover an episodic memory. In order to do this,
though, the researcher needs to have some basis for
assuming that an episodic memory can be recovered for
the experience. If it cannot, a question that asks for
such a memory implicitly invites the respondent to
infer or estimate rather than remember and this can
have adverse effects on quality of reporting later in the
interview (Pearson et al. 1992). In comparison, it
should be made clear whether a question is designed to
recover a semantic memory or to use semantic memo-
ries to arrive at an answer by estimation. 
One difficulty with these injunctions in the case of
retrospective recall questions about lifetime psychiatric
disorder is the uncertain level of recall accuracy. We
confronted this problem in the first NCS pretests when
we asked the standard CIDI questions about first onset:
‘When was the first time you had [disorder]?’ The
debriefing of pretest respondents revealed that where-
as some people had very vivid memories of their first
onsets, others had no such memory. The problem
posed by this variation was how to develop a method
of asking the question that reinforced our overall com-
mitment to collecting complete and accurate informa-
tion, while simultaneously recognizing the limits of
autobiographical memory and avoiding a request for a
precise answer from the subsample of respondents who
were unable to recover an episodic memory for their
first episode.
We resolved this problem by adapting several of the
principles discussed above in a three-part question
series designed to inform respondents that answers
should be as precise as possible while still recognising
the limits of memory. The question sequence began
with what has been referred to in the methodology lit-
erature as a ‘prequest’ – a question aimed at clarifying
the nature of the request for information in subsequent
questions. The prequest question was:
Can you remember your EXACT age the VERY
FIRST TIME you had a sudden spell of feeling fright-
ened or anxious and had several of these other things
[‘other things’ refers to a checklist of symptoms that
respondents previously reported which was presented
for visual review on a cue card] at the same time?
[Emphasis in original.]
During the second pretest we probed positive respons-
es to determine the basis for exact recall and discov-
ered that, overall, these respondents were either
younger (so the event was likely to have occurred more
recently), had a smaller number of lifetime episodes, or
had a distinctive context that allowed them to date the
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age of their vividly recalled first attack. Based on this
information, the final question series simply followed
this answer with the question ‘How old were you?’ In
comparison, respondents who answered the prequest
negatively were asked a different follow-up question
phrased in such a way as to make it clear that we want-
ed an estimate, based on our understanding that the
respondent could not provide an exact answer. This
question was: ‘ABOUT how old were you [the first
time you had one of these attacks] [emphasis in origi-
nal]?’ Interviewers were instructed to accept a range
response (such as ‘sometime in my early 20s’) without
probing, as we were soliciting an estimate. This ques-
tion was then followed by another that was designed to
provide an upper bound on our uncertainty concerning
age of onset and to permit the respondent to answer
even when uncertain about the exact age of the first
attack: ‘What is the earliest age you can CLEARLY
REMEMBER having one of these attacks?’ (Emphasis
in original.)
The latter question is much less demanding than
the original question about the exact age of the very
first attack, and, not surprisingly in light of this, virtu-
ally all respondents in the second pretest and in the
subsequent NCS were able to provide an age in their
answer. Interestingly, the age given in response to this
question was often younger than the lower bound of
the age range given in response to the preceding ques-
tion. This result was noticed in analysing the data from
the second pretest. Therefore, in the third pretest,
respondents with this pattern were asked to explain
the discrepancy. Their responses suggested that this
seemingly inconsistent result was due to the fact that
estimation was typically used to arrive at the response
to the question ‘ABOUT how old were you . . .?’ while
active memory search focusing on the part of the lifes-
pan implied by the answer to the preceding question
was used to arrive at the response to the subsequent
question. 
An experimental comparison of the WHO CIDI and the
modified CIDI
As noted above, comparison of the responses in the first
and second pretests suggested a reduction in miscom-
prehension and an increased effort to answer accurate-
ly as a result of the CIDI changes. However, as there
was no experimental manipulation of these conditions
and several aspects of the two pretests differed in ways
that are potentially important for response quality
(such as method of recruitment, site of interview
administration, focus of probing), it was impossible to
draw firm conclusions about the effects of these
changes from a comparison of the two pretests. As a
result, a split ballot experiment was carried out in
which respondents were randomly assigned to receive
either the original WHO CIDI 1.0 or the modified ver-
sion of the CIDI developed in the three pretests. This
experiment focused on the impact of these changes on
stem question and diagnosis endorsement probabilities. 
Summary results are reported in Table 1 for each of
the seven CIDI mood and anxiety disorders assessed in
the experiment. The first entry for each disorder is the
proportion of respondents in each condition who
endorsed the diagnostic stem question. The modified
procedures resulted in an increased proportion of
respondents endorsing diagnostic stem questions for six
of the seven disorders. Three of these six differences
are significant at the 0.05 level, each of them involv-
ing an extreme version of normal mood variation that
one might expect to require serious memory search to
recover (two weeks of depressed mood or anhedonia,
six months of worry, a fear of leaving home alone or of
being alone away from home). The modified version of
the instrument did not have any statistically signifi-
cant effects, in comparison, on the proportion of
respondents reporting the more vivid experiences asso-
ciated with panic, extreme fear of phobic stimuli, or
long periods of depressed mood lasting two years or
longer. 
The second entry for each disorder in the table
shows the proportions of respondents in each condi-
tion who met full lifetime criteria among those who
endorsed the stem question for the disorder. The
WHO CIDI diagnostic computer program was used to
generate diagnosis prevalence estimates. The modified
procedures resulted in increased conditional propor-
tions of respondents who met criteria for six of the
seven disorders. Two of these six differences, those for
agoraphobia and for simple phobia, are statistically sig-
nificant at the 0.05 level. 
The last two rows in the table report the proportions
of respondents who met lifetime criteria for at least one
of the seven disorders and for more than one of these
disorders. Nearly twice as many people who were given
the modified version of the instrument (38.7%) met
CIDI criteria for at least one disorder, as compared
with the original version (21.0%). Even more striking-
ly, nearly four times as many respondents who were
given the modified (19.0%) as the original (4.8%)
CIDI met criteria for two or more disorders.
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Apparently, a sizeable number of respondents avoided
providing an answer that was likely to elicit numerous
follow-up questions once they became aware of this
contingency. It is therefore important to administer all
stem questions before this contingency becomes appar-
ent. This last result suggests that the use of the life
review section at the beginning of the interview had its
greatest effect on responses to subsequent stem and
symptom questions among respondents who had
already been administered the full set of questions for
one or more diagnostic sections.
Comparison of the NCS and ECA prevalence 
estimates
As one would expect from the results of the experi-
ment, the NCS produced much higher lifetime preva-
lence estimates for most disorders than those found a
decade earlier in the ECA Study (Robins and Regier
1991). Overall, 48% of NCS respondents were esti-
mated to meet lifetime criteria for at least one DSM
disorder (Kessler et al. 1994) compared with 32.7% of
ECA respondents (Robins et al. 1991). The ECA diag-
noses were generated from the Diagnostic Interview
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Table 1: Estimated lifetime prevalences of diagnostic stems and full diagnostic criteria in an experimental comparison of the
WHO CIDI and modified CIDI.
DSM – III – R Diagnoses WHO CIDI Modified CIDI
% (se) % (se) t-test
I. Mood disorders
Major depressive episode Stem 28.6 (4.4) 51.9 (4.9) 3.52
disorder/stem 33.3 (8.9) 47.3 (7.6) 1.2
Dysthymia Stem 14.3 (3.4) 17.0 (3.6) 0.5
disorder/stem 40.0 (12.6) 50.0 (11.8) 0.6
Any mood disorder1 Stem 32.4 (4.6) 52.8 (4.8) 3.12
disorder/stem 35.3 (8.2) 50.0 (6.7) 1.4
II. Anxietydisorders
Panic disorders Stem 17.1 (3.7) 26.4 (4.3) 1.6
disorder/stem 5.8 (5.5) 7.2 (4.9 0.2
General anxiety disorder Stem 3.8 (1.9) 20.8 (4.0) 3.82
disorder/stem 25.0 (21.6) 31.8 (9.9) 0.3
Agoraphobia Stem 4.8 (2.1) 19.8 (3.9) 3.42
disorder/stem 20.0 (17.9) 76.2 (9.3) 2.82
Simple phobia Stem 42.9 (4.8) 53.8 (4.8) 1.6
disorder/stem 6.7 (3.7) 19.3 (5.2) 2.02
Social phobia Stem 32.4 (4.6) 28.3 (4.4) 0.6
disorder/stem 29.4 (7.8) 26.7 (8.1) 0.2
Any phobia Stem 56.2 (4.8) 64.2 (4.7) 1.2
disorder/stem 22.0 (5.4) 39.7 (5.9) 2.22
Any other anxiety disorder Stem 19.0 (3.8) 46.2 (4.8) 4.42
disorder stem 10.0 (6.7) 16.3 (5.3) 0.7
III. Mood or anxiety disorders
Any disorder 21.0 (3.9) 38.7 (4.7) 2.92
Two or more disorders 4.8 (2.1) 19.0 (3.8) 3.32
(n) (105) (106) 
1Diagnoses were made without using DSM-III-R hierarchy rules.
2The prevalence estimates in the two subsamples differ significantly at the 0.05 level.
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Schedule (DIS) (Robins et al. 1981), a fully structured
interview on which the subsequent development of the
CIDI was based and that shared the CIDI comprehen-
sion and motivation problems discovered in the NCS
pretests. 
As noted previously in the section on methods and
procedures, a subsequent post hoc comparison of the
ECA and NCS was carried out in collaboration with
Darrel Regier and his staff at NIMH. The ECA-NCS
comparison was designed to determine how much of
the dramatic difference between the prevalence esti-
mates in the two surveys might be due to differences in
sampling (local samples in each of five largely urban
areas in the ECA compared to a nationally representa-
tive sample in the NCS), age range (18+ in the ECA
compared with 15–54 in the NCS), differences in
depth of questions, or diagnostic system (DSM-III in
the ECA compared to DSM-III-R in the NCS). 
As described more fully by Regier et al. (1997), we
compared the subsample of 18–54 year old non-
Hispanic whites in the ECA with those in the urban-
ized NCS subsample and limited the analysis to the
subset of diagnoses that were assessed in a roughly
comparable way in the two surveys. This second
restriction allowed us to control for the fact that the
CIDI includes more items to assess certain diagnoses
than the instrument used in the ECA study. The age
range was constrained in order to correct for the exclu-
sion of elderly people in the NCS. The geography was
constrained in order to deal with the undersampling of
rural areas in the ECA. The focus on non-Hispanic
whites was made in order to adjust for the fact that the
minorities in the ECA were unrepresentative of those
in the total US (the Hispanics almost exclusively
being represented by Mexican-Americans residing in
one neighbourhood in Los Angeles and the blacks
over-representing those from low income urban areas).
Finally, all NCS diagnoses were redefined using DSM-
III criteria. 
Not suprisingly in light of the experimental results
reported above, these structural modifications did not
totally explain the discrepancies between ECA and
NCS lifetime prevalence estimates (Regier et al.
1997), although they did meaningfully reduce them.
The question arises of whether the remaining discrep-
ancies are due to some combination of four processes:
residual differences in NCS and ECA assessment pro-
cedures that could not be controlled in our analysis,
overestimation of lifetime prevalences in the NCS,
underestimation of lifetime prevalences in the ECA,
and the true lifetime prevalences of DSM-III disorders
increasing over the decade between the time the two
surveys were fielded. We acknowledge the first of these
possibilities, but have no way to correct for it. We dis-
missed the last of these possibilities based on the fact
that retrospective reports by NCS respondents in the
same cohorts as ECA respondents yielded higher life-
time prevalence estimates as of the years the ECA was
carried out than those obtained in the ECA from
respondents in these same cohorts. The remaining pos-
sibilities – overestimation in the NCS, underestima-
tion in the ECA, or both – could be major determi-
nants of the prevalence differences between the two
surveys. 
Further analysis led us to conclude that underesti-
mation in the ECA is a more important factor than
overestimation in the NCS. The most direct and per-
suasive evidence for this conclusion is presented in the
next section of the paper, where we review the results
of the NCS clinical reappraisal study. As is described in
more detail in that section, blind clinical reinterviews
documented that the CIDI interviews in the NCS did
not overdiagnose lifetime DSM-III-R disorders.
However, indirect evidence consistent with this find-
ing can be seen in the ECA-NCS comparisons.
Perhaps the most dramatic of these comes from an
analysis of the combined lifetime prevalence data esti-
mated in the baseline ECA and the ECA follow-up
survey completed one year after baseline. This follow-
up survey repeated the lifetime assessment rather than
asking only about disorders that occurred during the
year between waves. The lifetime prevalence estimates
increased dramatically when the two waves were com-
bined. For example, the lifetime prevalence estimate of
any DSM-III disorder in the combined sample was
46.9%, very similar to the 48% obtained in the NCS
(Regier et al. 1997). For some individual disorders the
prevalence increases were even more dramatic. For
example, there was a 78% increase in the estimated
lifetime prevalence of major depression when the two
waves of data were combined.
Importantly, the vast majority of the people who
reported a disorder in the follow-up of the ECA but
not the baseline interview stated in the reinterview
that their age of onset was well before the baseline
interview. This means that the increase in lifetime
prevalence at follow-up is due largely to remembering
past episodes rather than to reporting new onsets in
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the year between the two waves of data collection. The
most plausible interpretation of this finding that the
two-wave ECA prevalence estimates approximate the
one-wave NCS estimates is that the motivation and
memory-enhancing procedures used in the NCS stim-
ulated more complete reporting of lifetime disorders in
the NCS than the ECA. This interpretation is consis-
tent with the finding of Jay Turner and his colleagues
in Toronto (personal communication, 1997), who car-
ried out a two-wave panel survey with a 12-month
time interval between waves using the same interview
procedures as in the NCS, that the increase in lifetime
prevalence estimates was much smaller than in the
ECA Study. 
This interpretation is also consistent with the find-
ing that the lifetime prevalence differences between
the ECA and NCS are due largely to differences in the
probability of endorsing a lifetime diagnostic stem
question rather than in the conditional probability of
meeting full diagnostic criteria after endorsing the
stem question. A good example is the DSM-III diag-
nosis of major depressive episode, a syndrome having
one of the largest discrepancies in lifetime prevalence
estimates in the matched NCS (15.5%) and ECA
(7.7%) comparison samples. This discrepancy is due to
nearly twice as high a proportion of respondents
endorsing the stem questions for this syndrome in the
NCS (56.8%) as the ECA (32.2%), whereas very 
similar proportions of respondents met full diagnostic
criteria in the subsample of respondents who endorsed
the stem questions (27.3% in the NCS and 24.0% in
the ECA). 
The question could be raised as to whether the
higher stem endorsement probability in the NCS than
ECA resulted in the NCS focusing on more people
with symptom profiles that were not clinically signifi-
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Table 2: Distributions of Major Depression Criterion A symptoms in the ‘matched’ ECA (one wave) and NCS samples1
Total Black White Hispanic
ECA NCS ECA NCS ECA NCS ECA NCS
% % % % % % % %
I. Criteria stem endorsement
A1/2 Depressed mood and/or anhedonia 32.2 56.8 26.0 50.6 33.7 58.3 27.6 53.7
II. Symptom endorsement among respondents 
who endorsed the stem (either A1 or A2)
A3. Significant weight/appetite change 56.7 56.4 60.1 54.8 57.0 56.1 48.9 60.2
A4. Insomnia or hypersomnia 55.9 65.0 51.3 64.1 56.6 64.7 53.4 69.2
A5. Psychomotor agitation or retardation 49.9 57.3 42.1 56.5 51.7 57.0 41.1 60.7
A6. Fatigue/loss of energy 31.2 37.3 35.9 38.0 31.3 35.9 23.3 47.5
A7. Feeling of worthlessness or guilt 33.9 39.2 26.9 33.8 35.1 39.4 30.4 43.3
A8. Diminished ability to concentrate 45.4 50.5 41.7 48.6 46.6 50.7 36.4 50.8
A9. Recurrent thoughts of death or suicidality 57.7 62.2 51.2 57.1 58.9 63.0 53.2 61.4
III. Five or more criteria endorsed
(including A1 or A2) 24.0 27.3 20.4 26.4 24.9 27.4 20.5 28.6
IV. Rank order correlation of symptom prevalences 0.60 0.81 0.88 0.88
1Urban respondents in the age range 18–54.
2The percentages reported in parts II and III of the table are conditional percentages in the subsample of respondents who reported either
depressed mood (DSM-III-R) or anhedonia (Criterion A2). For example, the 56.7% of the 32.2% of the Criterion A1/A2 positives who
endorsed the CIDI questions about significant weight/appetite change represent 18.3% (0.567 × 0.322) of the total sample.
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cant. This does not appear to be the case from our
comparison of NCS and ECA symptom profiles in the
subsamples of respondents who endorsed the diagnos-
tic stem questions. An example is presented in Table 2,
where we show symptom profiles for major depressive
episodes in age-matched NCS and ECA subsamples
broken down by race/ethnicity. As shown there, symp-
tom prevalence and distributions are very similar
across the surveys in the subsample of those who
endorsed the depression stem questions. This suggests
that the same disorders were being recalled more com-
pletely in the NCS than the ECA rather than that the
NCS was eliciting information about less severe syn-
dromes than the ECA. 
Clinical reappraisal of the NCS CIDI cases
The ultimate test of the CIDI modifications developed
for the NCS would be a validity study. In the ideal
case, such a study would assign randomly selected com-
munity samples to be interviewed with either the orig-
inal CIDI or the modified CIDI and then blindly rein-
terviewed with a gold standard clinician-administered
diagnostic interview. A comparative validity study of
this sort was beyond the resources of the NCS pretest
study budget and was not approved for funding in sev-
eral subsequent attempts to seek separate support for
such a study. However, as noted above, we were able to
carry out a modest clinical reappraisal study of lifetime
prevalence estimates among NCS respondents who
endorsed diagnostic stem questions. 
Results are presented in Table 3, where we show the
relationships of both the CIDI diagnoses in the NCS
and the retest CIDI diagnoses with clinical diagnoses
based on the SCID. The first column of the table
shows the positive predictive value (PPV) of the diag-
noses. This is the proportion of CIDI cases confirmed
as cases in the clinical reinterviews. The PPVs for all
disorders other than panic disorder and generalized
anxiety disorder are greater than 0.50, ranging from
0.60 to 0.74 for mood disorders, from 0.63 to 0.93 for
anxiety disorders, and from 0.87 to 1.0 for substance
disorders. There is a tendency for values of PPV to be
somewhat higher for the retest CIDI than the CIDI
diagnoses in the NCS, indicating that part of the dis-
crepancy between the NCS CIDI and the SCID is due
to inconsistency in respondent reports over time. 
Clinical diagnoses of CIDI non-cases are reported in
the negative predictive value (NPV) columns in Table
3. Net predictive value is the proportion of CIDI non-
cases confirmed as non-cases in the clinical reinter-
views. The proportions of CIDI non-cases with posi-
tive stems who were determined to be cases in the clin-
ical reinterviews (1-NPV1) range from 0.00 to 0.20 for
mood disorders, from 0.07 to 0.50 for anxiety disorders,
and from 0.15 to 0.33 for substance disorders. There is
a tendency for values of 1-NPV1 to be somewhat lower
for the retest CIDI than the CIDI diagnoses in the
NCS, indicating that part of the discrepancy between
the NCS CIDI and the SCID is due to inconsistency in
respondent reports over time. 
We would expect PPV to be considerably larger
than 1-NPV1 if the CIDI-discriminated true cases
from non-cases in the subsample of respondents who
endorsed diagnostic stem questions. The table shows
that this is the case. Ratios of the proportions of CIDI
cases versus non-cases that were classified as cases in
the SCID are greater than 5:1 for seven of the 19
entries in the table, between 2:1 and 5:1 for 10 others,
and 2:1 or less for the remaining two entries. Positive
predictive value is significantly greater than 1-NPV1
at the 0.05 level in 18 of the 19 comparisons in the
table, the one exception being for the retest of gener-
alised anxiety disorder. The next entries in the table,
NPV2, are estimated upper bounds of NPV based on
the assumption that none of the CIDI stem-negative
non-cases would have been classified as cases if they
had received clinical reappraisal interviews. The val-
ues of these entries range from 0.91 to 1.0 for mood dis-
orders, from 0.85 to 1.0 for anxiety disorders, and from
0.67 to 0.85 for substance disorders. 
The κ values linking the CIDI and SCID diagnoses
are reported in the next column of the table; κ was
computed on weighted data. The computations adjust-
ed for the oversampling of CIDI cases in selecting
respondents for clinical reappraisal interviews and, as
noted above, were based on the assumption that none
of these respondents would have been classified as cases
if clinical reinterviews had been carried out among
them. The κ values for the NCS CIDI are above 0.6 for
two diagnoses (agoraphobia, social phobia), between
0.5 and 0.6 for five others (major depressive episode,
mania, simple phobia, alcohol-use disorders, and drug
use disorders), and below 0.5 for two others (0.43 for
panic disorder and 0.35 for generalised anxiety disor-
der). There is a general tendency for the κ values to be
somewhat higher for the retest CIDI than the CIDI
diagnoses in the NCS, with five of the κs above 0.60
and two others close to 0.60. 
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Table 3: Concordance between the CIDI and SCID in diagnosis-specific subsamples of NCS respondents
DSM-III-diagnoses1 Time of Positive Negative
CID6 predictive value predictive value K Bias9
PPV (se) (n) 1-NPV1 (se) t-test7 NPV2 (se) (n) K (se) +/– χ2
I. Mood disorders
Major depressive episode N 0.65 (0.11) (20) 0.20 (0.13) 2.7• 0.91 (0.09) (10) 0.53 (0.14) – 0.0
R 0.60 (0.10) (25) (0.00) (–) 3.78 1.0 (–) (5) 0.71 (0.11) + 8.0**
Mania2 N 0.74 (0.16) (7) 0.08 (0.09) 3.6• 0.99 (0.01) (52) 0.58 (0.11) – 1.8
II. Anxiety disorders
Panic disorder N 0.47 (0.11) (19) 0.10 (0.09) 2.6• 0.98 (0.04) (10) 0.43 (0.38) – 0.4
R 0.54 (0.14) (13) 0.19 (0.10) 2.0• 0.95 (0.05) (16) 0.36 (0.34) – 2.4
General anxiety disorders N 0.21 (0.11) (20) 0.30 (0.13) 1.6 0.97 (0.02) (10) 0.35 (0.26) – 1.7
R 0.23 (0.13) (29) 0.21 (0.10) 2.0• 0.98 (0.01) (14) 0.47 (0.24) + 0.2
Agoraphobia N 0.64 (0.20) (22) 0.17 (0.15) 1.9• 0.98 (0.01) (6) 0.63 (0.18) + 0.0
R 0.92 (0.11) (13) 0.20 (0.10) 4.8• 0.98 (0.02) (15) 0.79 (0.13) – 0.0
Simple phobia N 0.83 (0.09) (24) 0.36 (0.15) 2.7• 0.85 (0.04) (11) 0.54 (0.11) – 3.2
R 0.79 (0.10) (28) 0.29 (0.17) 2.5• 0.88 (0.04) (7) 0.57 (0.11) – 4.2**
Social phobia N 0.95 (0.05) (22) 0.50 (0.16) 3.0• 0.88 (0.04) (9) 0.68 (0.09) – 1.5
R 0.93 (0.06) (27) 0.00 (–) 1.0 (–) (4) 0.95 (0.04) – 0.1
Post traumatic stress disorder3 N 0.67 (0.17) (19) 0.11 (0.03) 3.2• 0.89 (0.03) (11) 0.39 (0.16) – 1.5
R 0.93 (0.06) (14) 0.07 (0.05) 11.0• 0.93 (0.02) (16) 0.66 (0.15) – 0.1
III. Substance disorders
Alcohol abuse/dependence4 N 0.92 (0.06) (20) 0.25 (0.14) 4.5• 0.75 (0.14) (10) 0.54 (0.09) – 1.3
R 1.0 (–) (19) 0.15 (0.11) 7.28 0.85 (0.11) (11) 0.74 (0.07) – 0.2
Drug abuse/dependence5 N 0.87 (0.07) (25) 0.33 (0.19) 2.7• 0.67 (0.14) (6) 0.39 (0.12) – 2.4
R 1.0 (–) (29) 0.14 (0.14) 3.58 0.86 (0.11) (2) 0.59 (0.11) – 0.1
*PPV is significantly larger than 1-NPV1 at the 0.5 level.
**The estimated prevalence based on the CIDI is significantly different from the estimated prevalence based on the SCID at the 0.5 level.
1Diagnoses were made without using DSM-III-R hierarchy rules.
2No retest CIDI data are reported because omission of one criterion in the reinterview made it impossible to generate a CIDI retest diagnosis
of mania.
3All computations are based on the subsamples of respondents who reported trauma exposure.
4All computations are based on the subsample of respondents who reported ever drinking one or more drinks in a single year of their life.
5All computations are based on the subsample of respondents who reported ever using drugs one or more times in their life.
6Results in rows marked ‘N’ compare the CIDI assessed in the NCS with the SCID, while results in rows marked ‘R’ compare the CIDI assessed
in the reappraisal interview with the SCID.
7t-tests evaluate the significance of differences between PPV and 1 – NPV1.
8Significance tests of difference scores were computed by adding 0.5 to the subsamples with no variance in the prevalence estimates to gener-
ate standard errors of these estimates.
9Chi-square tests evaluate the significance of differences between estimated prevalences based on the CIDI and the SCID using the McNemar
procedure.
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Values of less than 1.0 for κ mean that there is
imprecision in the CIDI prevalence estimates. It is not
clear, though, whether there is bias, as both false posi-
tives (PPV less than 1.0) and false negatives (NPV2
less than 1.0) were observed. Bias was evaluated by
comparing the CIDI estimated prevalences with the
SCID estimated prevalences based on two-by-two
tables of weighted data that took into consideration
the unequal probabilities of selection into the clinical
reinterview samples. The McNemar test (Bishop et al.
1975) was used to test the significance of prevalence
differences. As shown in the last column of Table 3,
the majority of the CIDI prevalence estimates were
lower than the SCID prevalence estimates (16 of 19).
However, none of the differences involving the CIDI
prevalence estimates in the NCS is statistically signifi-
cant at the 0.05 level. Two involving the retest CIDI
are significant, one of them an overestimated preva-
lence of major depressive episodes and the other an
underestimated prevalence of simple phobia in the
CIDI compared to the SCID. 
Conscious non-disclosure
It must be noted that we ignored the difficult question
of whether respondents are honest either with the
interviewer or with themselves in discussing their his-
tory of psychopathology. The issue of honesty is a prob-
lematic one. The methodological literature on the
accuracy of respondent reports shows clearly that the
perceived social desirability of responses is important
in determining the accuracy of reports (Sudman and
Bradburn 1974; Kessler and Wethington 1991),
although recent research suggests that the magnitude
of social desirability bias is smaller than previously sus-
pected (Sudman et al. 1996). We have no way of
assessing the magnitude of this problem in the CIDI
with available data, but it clearly needs to be taken
into consideration as methodological refinements of
the CIDI continue to be made. Strategies exist to
increase willingness to disclose embarrassing informa-
tion (Bradburn et al. 1979; Turner et al. 1992). The use
of these strategies should be investigated in future
methodological studies of the CIDI. 
Future directions 
Improving question comprehension
The NCS pretest study results clearly showed that our
efforts to improve question comprehension were useful.
A number of the wording changes implemented in the
NCS on the basis of the pretests were subsequently
introduced into the most recent version of the CIDI,
Version 2.1 in order to improve comprehension. For
example, the very complex question in CIDI 1.0 con-
cerning agoraphobic fears – ‘Were you afraid of col-
lapsing, or of the occurrence of other incapacitating or
embarrassing symptoms when no help was available or
escape possible?’ – was changed in CIDI 2.1 to a pair of
much less complex questions:
Were you afraid of [SITUATIONS DESCRIBED
EARLIER] because you would be unable to escape if
you suddenly had some of these problems? 
Were you afraid of [SITUATIONS DESCRIBED
EARLIER] because you might be unable to get help if
you suddenly had some of these problems? 
Our sense is that the most recent English language ver-
sion of the CIDI has few remaining basic comprehen-
sion problems, although further cognitive interviewing
with representative community samples will be needed
to verify this impression. The remaining potential
problems of this sort that we have been able to extract
from our review of the instrument mostly involve three
sorts of questions. The first are questions that rely on
the understanding of a single focal word, such as
‘During that period, were you restless?’ This question is
difficult because it requires the respondent to under-
stand the word ‘restless’ and also to infer something
about the level and persistence of the symptom that
would qualify as being enough to mention. There are
some questions in CIDI 2.1 that address both of these
problems in secondary clauses. For example, the fol-
lowing question in the somatization section about
paralysis offers both a definition of the term and a clear
specification of minimal level and persistence: ‘Have
you ever been paralysed – that is, completely unable to
move a part of your body for at least a few minutes?’
The decision to include clarifications such as this in
some questions but not others was based entirely on
the intuition of the person writing the question regard-
ing whether most people would understand the ques-
tion without such clarifications. We believe that the
instrument would be improved by basing decisions of
this sort on empirical evidence against a gold standard
(the determination whether the question wording
yields responses that are consistent with clinician
symptom evaluations) rather than intuition. 
The second set of potentially problematic questions
remaining in the CIDI from the point of view of com-
prehension are those that rely on vague quantifiers. An
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especially important example that appears repeatedly
throughout the CIDI is the question ‘Did [SYMPTOM]
interfere with your life and activities a lot?’
Methodological studies show that there is enormous
between-person variability in the interpretation of
vague quantifiers such as the word ‘a lot’ (Schaeffer
1991). Our own preliminary studies, in fact, suggest
that only about half as many respondents report ‘a lot’
of interference due to psychiatric problems in response
to the question ‘How much did (SYMPTOM) interfere
with your life or activities – a lot, some, a little, or not
at all?’ than if they are asked a yes–no question about
interfering a lot. Consistent responses to such ques-
tions are critical to the validity of the CIDI. As a
result, further methodological research is needed to
determine whether the use of vague quantifiers in
questions of this sort can be justified and, if not,
whether more explicit questions can be developed to
avoid the use of vague quantifiers.
The third set of potentially problematic questions
remaining in the CIDI from the point of view of com-
prehension are those that use explicit quantifiers
embedded in questions that are so complex that the
quantifiers are not heard by all respondents. A good
example is the CIDI stem question for major depression:
Now I want to ask you about periods of feeling sad,
empty, or depressed. In your lifetime, have you ever
had two weeks or longer when nearly every day you felt
sad, empty, or depressed for most of the day?
As noted earlier in the paper, the NCS pretests found
that many respondents do not hear all aspects of this
question. Indeed, in more recent methodological stud-
ies, we have found that as many as one-fourth of the
respondents who endorse this stem question contradict
themselves in response to one or both of the following
two additional probes: 
On the days you felt this way, did these feelings last all
day long, most of the day, about half the day, or less
than half the day? 
During these two weeks, did you feel this way every
day, almost every day, or less often than that? 
Such discrepancies demonstrate that many respon-
dents attend to some aspects of complex questions
more than others. In cases when it is important that all
aspects of the question be heard, as in this example, it
might be necessary to ask a series of separate focused
questions rather than a single question. Future
methodological research is needed to investigate this
possibility. 
Improving question calibration in relation to diagnostic 
criteria
An issue related to the vague quantifier problem con-
cerns the possibility that some CIDI questions are not
calibrated to the same level of intensity as the DSM or
ICD criteria they are designed to operationalize. This
is not a problem of respondent comprehension but of
mismatch between the naive psychometrics implicit in
the CIDI question-writing process and the validation
standard the questions are intended to approximate.
For example, the DSM-IV Criterion A3 for substance
abuse of ‘recurrent substance-related legal problems
(e.g. arrests for substance-related disorderly conduct)’
is operationalized in the CIDI with the question ‘In
your lifetime, has your use of [substance] ever led to
problems with the police?’ Aside from the fact that this
question does not ask about ‘recurrent’ problems, there
is the possibility that the word ‘problem’ means some-
thing quite different to different people depending on
their history of contact with the legal system. Variation
of this sort, if it exists, could presumably be corrected
without great difficulty by clarifying the types of expe-
riences that qualify as problems. 
Investigations of this sort will require a comparison
of CIDI responses to some validation standard. We
have carried out preliminary work of this sort in the
NCS clinical reappraisal sample in which we compared
criterion-level responses to the CIDI with the SCID
for several diagnoses (Wittchen et al. 1995, 1996). Our
overall finding was that criterion-level agreement was
generally quite good and that serious calibration prob-
lems were limited to a small number of criteria. In the
case of generalized anxiety disorder, for example, we
found that there was only one major threshold prob-
lem: a disagreement between the CIDI and the clinical
interviewers on criterion A2 involving whether the
worries were excessive or unrealistic.
Replicated criterion-level investigations of this sort
across a wide range of populations are needed to pin-
point and correct systematic calibration problems in the
CIDI. We are currently involved in a cross-national
collaborative study of this sort involving the CIDI
assessment of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In
this work, we are expanding the structured CIDI ques-
tions for all the criteria of PTSD where calibration
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problems might exist and using systematic cognitive
interviewing to make sure there are no comprehension
problems in these new questions. Then we are admin-
istering this expanded section of the CIDI to samples
of trauma victims around the world by collaborators
who are using the same clinical reappraisal interview.
Our hope is that this exercise will lead to the docu-
mentation of cross-nationally consistent but limited
CIDI calibration problems that can be corrected by
modifying the assessment of the problematic criteria to
use some subset of the expanded CIDI questions
included in the data collection. If so, this evaluation of
the CIDI PTSD section could serve as a model for
future CIDI developments. 
Motivating accurate reporting
The evidence reviewed above from the methodologi-
cal literature is quite clear that there are endemic
motivational problems in most survey interviews, espe-
cially in interviews that deal with topics that are
embarrassing or otherwise uncomfortable to talk about.
The evidence is equally clear that strategies of the sort
used in the NCS, including the use of motivational
instructions, commitment questions, and contingent
feedback, are able to reduce these problems. As a
result, most professional academic survey organizations
in the US and other Western countries have adopted
the use of these strategies. Contingent feedback, in
particular, is now a routine part of interviewer training
in major academic survey research centres around the
world. Yet the WHO CIDI Advisory Committee has
not agreed so far to adopt these strategies for use in the
CIDI. It is not clear to us why this is the case. Our
hope, though, is that the Committee will re-evaluate
this decision and include the use of these strategies in
future versions of the CIDI.
Facilitating accurate reporting
The main effort in the NCS, to facilitate accurate
reporting beyond the use of motivational techniques,
focused on lifetime recall of diagnostic stem questions.
Our strategy here was to develop the lifetime review sec-
tion described earlier in this article and to use inter-
viewer administration procedures (reading the questions
slowly, instructing the respondents to take their time and
think carefully before answering) that were designed to
facilitate active memory search. The debriefing of
pretest respondents suggests that these procedures did, 
in fact, lead to more active memory search. This is 
something that can be especially important among older
respondents, as the reconstructive process gets more dif-
ficult and the length of the recall period increases. The
results of the experiment reported in Table 1 showed
clearly that the more active memory work resulted in a
significant increase in the proportion of respondents
who endorsed lifetime diagnostic stem questions.
Despite this evidence, the WHO CIDI Advisory
Committee has not agreed so far to adopt the life review
section as part of the official CIDI. The Committee
clearly recognizes that the use of a life review section sig-
nificantly increases the proportion of respondents
endorsing stem questions and, in this way, increases life-
time prevalence estimates of disorders. However, their
concern, as expressed to us by a number of Committee
members, is that this might result in an increase in false
positive diagnoses.
This is a legitimate concern in the abstract but it is
inconsistent with the facts. The most important fact is
that, as reported earlier in this paper, the NCS clinical
reappraisal study found no evidence of overestimation
of lifetime prevalences in the NCS. It is worth noting
in this regard that only a minority of general popula-
tion respondents who endorse a diagnostic stem ques-
tion go on to meet full diagnostic criteria for that dis-
order in the CIDI. Our assumption in developing the
life review section was that the large number of symp-
tom questions administered after a positive stem
response would be responsible for sorting out true cases
from non-cases. The NCS clinical reappraisal study
shows this to be the case. 
Far from guarding against overdiagnosis, failure to
adopt a life review approach to recall has the adverse
effect of promoting underdiagnosis of lifetime disorders
in cross-sectional general population epidemiologic
surveys. This, in turn, creates two important false
impressions about the epidemiology of psychiatric dis-
orders: that they are more rare than they really are and
that, when they occur, they have a very high probabil-
ity of becoming chronic or recurrent. In addition, this
underdiagnosis in baseline cross-sectional surveys leads
to serious difficulties of interpretation in longitudinal
follow-up surveys. As we saw above in the discussion of
the second wave of the ECA study, underestimation of
lifetime prevalences in a baseline survey leads to unre-
alistically high estimated rates of first onset between
the baseline and subsequent waves. These unrealisti-
cally high estimates, in turn, make it difficult to study
incidence. It is largely due to this difficulty that the
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two-wave ECA panel data have never been adequate-
ly analysed even though NIMH invested millions of
dollars in collecting these data. As noted above, the
work of Turner and his colleagues, who carried out a
two-wave survey similar to the ECA in Toronto, shows
that these unrealistically high incidence estimates are
not found when the life review section is used to stim-
ulate lifetime recall in the baseline survey. 
Based on these considerations, we believe that the
life review section should become a standard part of
the CIDI. In addition, we believe that much more
should be done to modify the CIDI so as to improve
accuracy of recall of answers to other complex ques-
tion. There are a great many questions in the CIDI
that pose difficult memory challenges for respondents,
including questions about the age of onset of disorders,
the number of lifetime episodes of particular disorders,
the length of longest lifetime episodes, and symptom
clusters present in particular episodes. The work of
cognitive psychologists reviewed earlier in this paper
has dealt with questions of these types in other con-
texts and has shown that it is often possible to improve
reporting accuracy by using a variety of memory-
enhancing techniques such as decomposition (break-
ing down complex memory tasks into easier compo-
nent parts) and anchoring (asking whether particular
occurrences happened before or after salient marker
events rather than at particular ages). These tech-
niques all take advantage of the knowledge amassed by
cognitive scientists over the past decade about the
ways in which information is stored in memory and the
strategies that are most effective is recovering this
information. A serious programme of research in
which the WHO CIDI Advisory Committee actively
collaborated with cognitive psychologists to study
memory processes involved in answering CIDI recall
questions would probably result in a number of CIDI
modifications that would substantially improve report-
ing accuracy.
Recognizing the limits of reporting accuracy
The CIDI can be faulted not only because it includes a
great many difficult lifetime recall questions without
providing memory aids but also because it does not
acknowledge the difficulty and, in some cases, the
impossibility of providing accurate answers to these
questions. As reviewed earlier in the paper, the litera-
ture on the limits of memory makes it perfectly clear
that failure to acknowledge the limits of memory can
lead to reductions in data quality because it encourages
guessing, fails to motivate serious memory search with-
in the limits of memory, and provides no means of cap-
turing accurate partial information. 
Our main modifications of the CIDI for the NCS
concerning the limits of memory focused on questions
about age of onset. As described earlier in the paper,
we dealt with the memory problem for age of onset by
using a three-question series developed by Charles
Cannell that began with a meta question (‘Can you
remember your exact age the very first time . . .?’) and
then sought to capture partial information (‘About
how old were you . . .?’ and ‘What’s the earliest age you
can clearly remember . . .?’) in cases where the respon-
dent did not have a vivid memory of their age of first
onset. Our debriefing of pretest respondents convinced
us that this sequence is far superior to the standard age
of onset question used in the DIS and CIDI, a view
confirmed by a subsequent methodological study
(Knäuper et al. in press) that documented the disap-
pearance of the apparently biased lumping of age of
onset reports five years prior to the time of interview
found in the ECA Study (Simon and Von Korff 1992,
1995) in the NCS. Despite this evidence, the WHO
CIDI Advisory Committee has not agreed so far to
adopt this improved set of age-of-onset questions for
reasons that are unclear to us. We believe that these
questions should be adopted in future versions of the
CIDI and that a series of studies should be undertaken
to investigate other ways in which the accuracy of
responses to CIDI recall questions can be improved by
introducing modifications that recognise the limits of
reporting accuracy. 
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